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1 Introduction
A large literature has focused on how monetary policy should be chosen so as to stabilize
the economy against unexpected shocks. This literature has studied how monetary policy
is chosen depending on the preferences of the central bank and it has found that monetary
policy should be delegated to an independent and conservative central bank – see Sargent
and Wallace (1981), Barro and Gordon (1983), Rogoff (1985a) and Svensson (1996) and
the works that followed. Independent means that the central bank has full control over the
instruments of monetary policy and therefore over the decision of how much of the fiscal
deficit to monetize. By conservative this literature means that the central bank should have
a lower inflation and/or output target and/or a lower weight on the output target than
society does. Central bank conservatism eliminates the inflation bias stemming from the
time inconsistency of monetary policy, which is commonly believed to have contributed to
high inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Following these seminal works, many countries have made their central banks increasingly
independent and more conservative than the politicians who run fiscal policy in recent years.
For example, the Maastricht Treaty that established the Economic and Monetary Union of
Europe determines that the European Central Bank should primarily be concerned with
price stability in the Euro area and it forbids it from financing the deficits of the member
countries or bailing them out even in a fiscal crisis.
A crucial feature of this literature is that fiscal policy is either absent or assumed exoge-
nously fixed and constant. In reality, however, macroeconomic stabilization consists of both
monetary and fiscal policies; most importantly, these two policies interact via their effects
on output and inflation.
The goal of this paper is to explicitly model fiscal policy to consider such interactions
and how they affect economic outcomes. We develop a model whose natural rate of output is
suboptimally low because firms enjoy monopolistic power over the goods they produce. Fiscal
policy consists of government spending over the goods produced in the economy financed
by lump-sum taxes. Government spending can bring output to its efficient level, but it may
not be socially optimal to do so because public spending reduces private consumption and
welfare. This leaves an output gap that creates a time-consistency problem for both monetary
and fiscal policies. With some prices preset, the central bank thinks it can raise output in the
short run by an unanticipated monetary expansion that boosts private demand; similarly, the
fiscal authority thinks it can raise output by an unanticipated increase in public spending
that boosts public demand. In equilibrium, these incentives are perfectly anticipated by
rational firms and they simply bias policies away from optimality.
But time inconsistency is not the only problem here. Central bank conservativeness
creates a conflict of objectives between monetary and fiscal policies that makes them interact
suboptimally. The equilibria are suboptimal and possibly extreme no matter whether policies
are discretionary or pre-committed.
We can summarize our results as follows:
1. If neither type of policy has commitment or leadership, the Nash equilibrium has higher
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output and lower inflation than optimal; these outcomes may be extreme with respect
to both authorities’ goals, depending on the realization of the stochastic shocks.
2. Giving leadership (first-mover advantage) to fiscal policy typically improves welfare
over Nash from an ex-ante perspective. However, even fiscal leadership is not optimal.
3. The time-consistency problem of monetary policy can be solved by commitment to a
rule specifying how the actual policy choice will respond to all possible realizations of
the stochastic shocks. But with discretionary fiscal policy chosen by a strategic fiscal
authority, the ex post reaction function of the fiscal authority acts as a constraint
on the monetary rule. We find that this entirely negates the advantage of monetary
commitment – the optimal monetary rule is no different than discretionary leadership
of monetary over fiscal policy for every realization of the shocks. Fiscal commitment,
on the other hand, eliminates the time inconsistency of fiscal policy and, if coupled
with an appropriately designed central bank, it leads to the social optimum. The
asymmetry between monetary and fiscal commitment stems from the fact that fiscal
policy has direct negative effects on social welfare while monetary policy does not.
4. Commitment achieves the second best if it can be extended to both monetary and
fiscal policy.
5. If commitment to a policy rule is not an option, the second best can be achieved by
appropriately assigning goals to policies so as to avoid any conflict of objectives. Two
alternative assignments are possible. First, the two authorities should have identical
targets, the output target being the social optimum and the inflation target being con-
servative. Second, the two authorities should have separate targets, with the monetary
authority targeting only inflation and the fiscal authority targeting output and the
welfare losses due to fiscal policy.
2 Literature Review
Our paper takes as a starting point the findings of the literature on commitment and dis-
cretion in monetary policy initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon
(1983). These works assume that distortions create short-run benefits from unexpected in-
flation and study the equilibria that arise under different institutional arrangements and
their welfare properties. The first-best equilibrium can only be achieved by eliminating the
distortions directly, which is not assumed to be feasible; pre-commitment to a monetary rule
that specifies how monetary policy should responds to shock delivers the second best; discre-
tionary monetary policymaking results in fourth-best equilibria because of time-consistency
problems. Rogoff (1985a) and Svensson (1996) find that third- or even second-best equilibria
can be obtained by delegating monetary policy to a conservative central bank. Alternatively,
an optimal central bank contract as suggested by Walsh (1995) and Persson and Tabellini
(1993) can lead to the second best. All these papers do not consider fiscal policy or simply
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assume it as exogenous or constant. Our work explicitly models fiscal policy and stud-
ies the equilibria that emerge when the fiscal authority is a strategic player; it shows that
monetary-fiscal interactions are indeed suboptimal when the monetary and fiscal authorities
have conflicting goals.
There are some works that analyze the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies and our
work is related to two of them. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) consider a closed-economy model
where the monetary authority chooses the inflation rate and the fiscal authority chooses the
tax rate to finance government expenditures; both authorities have identical, explicit targets
for inflation, output and the level of government expenditures but different tradeoffs among
the targets. They find that monetary commitment may fail to improve welfare when the
authorities have different tradeoffs among the goals because the loss of seignorage stemming
from lower inflation induces an increase in taxes and a reduction in output that more than
compensate the gain from lower inflation. Our paper differs from Alesina and Tabellini in
many respects, but most notably in three. First, we do not consider public spending targets
and rather focus on the welfare effects stemming from output and inflation stabilization.
Second, we consider the case where the monetary and fiscal authorities have different targets
and weights, which is a crucial difference as shown in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). Third,
when they briefly consider the case with no government spending targets, their model does
not have a time-consistency problem, so that output and inflation are at their common
targeted levels.
Debelle and Fischer (1994) study the case where the monetary authority has no explicit
preferences about the level of public expenditures and consider Nash and Stackelberg equi-
libria, but do not consider state-contingent monetary rules.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003a, 2001) study monetary-fiscal interactions for the case of
a monetary union. Both papers consider a model where monetary and fiscal policies do
not have a time-consistency problem because optimal fiscal policy closes any output gap.
The first work focuses on the case where the common central bank and all countries’ fiscal
authorities have identical output and inflation targets but possibly different tradeoffs between
they objectives. It shows that the ideal output and inflation outcomes can be achieved for
any order of moves, whether policies are discretionary or pre-committed. The second paper
considers the more general case where the common central bank and the fiscal authorites
have different goals and tradeoffs among them; it finds that this conflict of objectives leads
to output and inflation outcomes that are extreme and different from what the authorities
want. Our paper differs from Dixit and Lambertini (2003a, 2001) in two related respects.
We derive social welfare and assume that fiscal policy is chosen so as to maximize it. This
has three consequences: first, monetary and fiscal policies have a time-consistency problem;
second, our analysis can rank equilibria from a social welfare point of view; third, we can
address the issue of what design of monetary and fiscal institutions maximizes social welfare.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) study monetary-fiscal interactions in a model where fiscal
policy consists of a production subsidy that creates deadweight losses. In their paper, a
fiscal expansion is a higher subsidy that raises production and reduces prices. In our model
fiscal policy consists of public spending financed by lump-sum taxes; a fiscal expansion is an
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increase in public spending that raises production and prices. The equilibria in our paper
and their welfare implications are different from those in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b). For
example, in our paper time inconsistency makes fiscal policy more expansionary than optimal
at the Nash equilibrium; as a result, monetary policy is more contractionary than optimal
and the Nash equilibrium has lower inflation and higher output than optimal. The opposite
occurs in Dixit and Lambertini. The characteristics of the leadership equilibria also differ
substantially.
Our work shows that if both monetary and fiscal policies have a time-consistency problem,
making the monetary, but not the fiscal, authority conservative may make things worse.
The general idea behind our result – reminiscent of the second best theory – is present in
other works on policymaking with multiple strategic interactions. Rogoff (1985b) and Kehoe
(1989), for example, show that cooperation between two governments with an incentive
toward time-inconsistent behavior may reduce welfare as lack of policy cooperation acts as
a disciplining device.
3 The Model
3.1 Consumers
We consider a general equilibrium model with differentiated goods, monopolistic competi-
tion and staggered prices.1 The representative household maximizes the discounted sum of
utilities of the form
Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUs, (1)
where the period utility function is
Us =
[
logCs + χ log
Ms
Ps
−
d
1 + η
∫ 1
0
Ns(i)
1+ηdi+
α
1− 1/ρ
G1−1/ρs
]
, (2)
with d > 0, χ > 0, η ≥ 0 and ρ > 1. 0 < β < 1 is a discount factor, C is consumption,
M/P are real balances, N(i) is the quantity of labor of type i supplied by the representative
individual and G is public spending. Hence, it is assumed here that period utility depends
positively on public good provision, with the parameter α measuring the relative importance
of public versus private consumption for welfare. Because we are interested in studying how
monetary and fiscal polices can better stabilize output and inflation in response to shocks,
our welfare analysis will be based on the limiting economy as α goes to zero and public
spending ceases to raise social welfare per se.2
1For an excellent survey of this literature, see Woodford (2003).
2We do not need to assume that α→ 0. In fact, our results hold true if α > 0 as long as α < 1/(θ − 1);
since most estimates of θ suggest a value around 11, we focus on economies where α < 0.1 and public
spending raises private utility considerably less than private consumption. Intuitively, if α < 1/(θ − 1)
government spending is a public good that raises social welfare but, in a sense, not enough; the natural rate
of output is still suboptimally low so that monetary and fiscal policies are time inconsistent. See Appendix
C for a detailed proof.
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Our utility function assumes that private and public consumption are separable; this
allows us to consider the case where public spending does not enter the utility function as the
limiting economy with α → 0 and to easily compare our results with the existing literature
on monetary-fiscal interactions, which typically assumes that government spending does not
raise social welfare per se. A simplifying but restrictive feature implied by separability is that
the marginal utility of private consumption at date t is independent of public spending at
date t and t+1. The assumption that individual preferences are logarithmic in private while
more generally isoelastic in public consumption is completely inconsequential: for ρ = 1 the
last term in the period utility function is replaced by its limit, α logGs.
Ct is the real consumption index
Ct =
[∫ 1
0
Ct(i)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
, (3)
where θ > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution among the individual goods available
in the economy. The corresponding price index Pt is
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θdi
] 1
1−θ
, (4)
which is the minimum cost of a unit of the aggregate consumption good defined by (3), given
the individual goods prices Pt(i). There is a continuum of differentiated goods distributed
over the interval [0, 1]. In (1), Nt(i) is the quantity of labor of type i supplied by the
representative household and it is assumed that each differentiated good uses a specialized
labor input in its production. The assumption of differentiated labor inputs is not necessary
but convenient, as households with identical initial assets supply the same quantities of labor
and receive the same labor income. η > 0 is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor
with respect to labor supply. The parameters d, θ, η are stochastic.
If all households begin with the same amount of financial assets, as we assume, they
will have the same intertemporal budget constraints and will therefore choose the same se-
quences of consumption, real balances and efforts. Hence, our model is truly a representative
household one. The budget constraint for such agent is
Bt+1
1 + rt
+
Mt
Pt
+ Ct = Bt +
Mt−1
Pt
+
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)
Pt
Nt(i)di+
∫ 1
0
Πt(i)
Pt
di+ Tt − τt. (5)
Here Bt+1 is the purchase of a riskless bond that pays one unit of aggregate consumption at
time t+1; since all household are the same, this asset is redundant and, in equilibrium, there
will be no trade in it. Wt(i) is the nominal wage of labor of type i in period t and Πt(i) are
nominal profits of the firm producing good i. We assume that each household owns an equal
share of all the firms in the economy. Tt represents transfers received from the household at
time t and τt is a lump-sum tax levied by the government at time t.
Households face four decisions. First, how to allocate consumption across the differ-
entiated goods. Taking prices as given, the optimal consumption of each good i is given
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by
Ct(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−θ
Ct. (6)
Second, the household must decide the optimal amount of riskless bonds to purchase, Bt+1.
The first-order condition delivers the Euler equation
1
Ct
= β(1 + rt)Et
1
Ct+1
. (7)
Third, the household must decide the optimal level of money balances to carry into next
period, Mt. After making use of (7), the first-order condition for optimal money balances is
given by3
Mt
Pt
= χCt
1
Et
it+1
1+it+1
, (8)
where iet+1 is the expected nominal interest rate between period t and t+ 1:
(1 + iet+1) = (1 + rt)Et
Pt+1
Pt
. (9)
Finally, the household must decide the optimal quantity of each type of labor to supply,
taking wages and prices as given. The related first-order condition is given by
Nt(i) =
[
Wt(i)
PtCtd
] 1
η
. (10)
3.2 Policymakers
There is a central bank that runs monetary policy and a government that runs fiscal policy.
The central bank is instrument-independent in the sense that it chooses monetary policy
freely and it does not share the government budget constraint. We also assume that the
central bank is conservative in the sense that it maximizes a utility that is more conservative
than society’s – this will be explained in detail in Section 4. The budget constraint for the
central bank is
Tt =
Mt −Mt−1
Pt
. (11)
Hence, the central bank rebates seignorage back to households.
Fiscal policy consists of public spending financed with lump-sum taxes τt. The budget
constraint for the government is
τt = Gt. (12)
For simplicity, we assume that government allocates its consumption across goods like house-
holds do so that
Gt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−θ
Gt. (13)
3To obtain (8), we have assumed that Ct+1 and it+1 are independent.
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The government is benevolent and chooses Gt so as to maximize the utility function of the
representative individual. Optimal public spending is given by
Gt = (αCt)
ρ. (14)
Optimal public spending becomes negligible as α goes to zero.
3.3 Firms
Each good has a production function that makes only use of labor
Yt(i) = AtNt(i), (15)
where At is an exogenous stochastic technological factor common to all firms, i.e. a supply-
side aggregate shock. Nomimal profits at time t for firm i are given by
Πt(i) = Pt(i)Yt(i)−Wt(i)Nt(i). (16)
The first term on the right hand side of (16) represents revenues from selling the good; the
second term is the cost of producing, which is the nominal wage bill for employed labor. We
have assumed that the firm takes the nominal wage as given. Firms maximize the present
value of current and future profits
∞∑
s=t
βs−tEtQt,sΠs(i), (17)
where Qt,s is the stochastic discount factor
Qt,s =
u′(cs)Pt
u′(ct)Ps
= Πsj=tQj,j+1. (18)
From equation (6) and (11) we can obtain the demand for good i
Yt(i)
d =
[
Pt(i)
Pt
]
−θ
(Ct +Gt). (19)
If prices are flexible, firms choose prices every period to maximize current profits. The
first-order condition is:
Pt(i) =
θ
θ − 1
Wt(i)
At
. (20)
With flexible prices, it is optimal for the firm to set its price as a markup over the marginal
cost. The markup θ/(θ− 1) falls as θ grows, i.e. as goods become better substitutes and the
monopolistic power of the firm becomes smaller.
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3.4 Equilibrium
Aggregate output is defined as
Yt ≡
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)
Pt
Yt(i) di. (21)
Making use of (11), (12), (16), (21) and the fact that the bonds are in zero net supply, the
consolidated budget constraint becomes
Ct = Yt −Gt. (22)
Private consumption is equal to aggregate production minus government spending.
3.5 Steady State
At the randomless steady state, all differentiated goods have identical prices and wages across
labor types are identical. Hence
W
P
=
θ − 1
θ
A, (23)
where variables without a time subscript indicate steady-state values. Labor is also equalized
across different types and is given by
N =
[
(θ − 1)A
θdC
]1/η
. (24)
The price level is
P =
M(1− β)
χC
(25)
and steady-state output is
Y = AN = A
[
(θ − 1)A
θd(Y −G)
]1/η
, (26)
where government spending is given by
G = (αC)ρ. (27)
An increase in government spending raises output in the steady state. Because higher gov-
ernment spending requires higher taxes, households reduce consumption and substitute out
of leisure into work, thereby raising production. Hence, government spending does not crowd
out private spending completely. If public spending is zero, steady-state output is given by
Y = A
[
θ − 1
θd
] 1
1+η
. (28)
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Steady state output is suboptimally low due to the monopolistic power of producers. As the
degree of substitutability among goods becomes large, i.e. θ → ∞, output approaches its
efficient level
Y ∗ = A
[
1
d
] 1
1+η
. (29)
The efficient level of output can also be achieved by an appropriate production subsidy that
offsets the distortion due to market power;4 here we abstract from such subsidy.
3.6 Staggered Pricing
We assume a discrete-time variant of the Calvo (1983) model of staggered-price setting that
has been extensively used in the literature. A fraction φ ∈ (0, 1) of prices remain unchanged
in each period, while new prices are chosen for the remaining 1 − φ fraction of goods. The
probability that any given price will be changed in any given period is assumed to follow a
Poisson process with arrival rate 1− φ, which is independent of time elapsed since the price
was last changed. This assumption about the dynamics of prices implies that
P 1−θt =
[
φP 1−θt−1 + (1− φ)P˜
1−θ
t
]
. (30)
All suppliers that set new prices at t face exactly the same decision problem; hence, the
newly set price P˜t is the same for all of them (and is therefore not a function of i).
A supplier that sets a new price at t chooses it so as to maximize
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−tEtQt,sΠs(i), (31)
where the factor φs−t indicates the probability that the price chosen at t will still be charged
in period s > t. Appendix A solves the firm’s problem with staggered pricing and Appendix
B log-linearizes the model around the steady state. Aggregate inflation is as a function of
monetary and fiscal policies and current shocks:
πt = mt + cgt + ωt + γβπ
e
t+1, (32)
where small letters indicate percent deviations from the steady state of the capitalized-letter
variable and
πt ≡ pt − pt−1, mt =
ψ
1 + ψ
µt, c =
λη
1 + ψ
> 0, ψ = (1− β)λ(1 + η), λ =
(1− φβ)(1− φ)
φ
,
ωt = −
λ(1 + η)
1 + ψ
at −
ψ
1 + ψ
pt−1 +
βλ(1 + η)
1 + ψ
yet+1, γ =
1 + λ(1 + η)
1 + ψ
> 0.
Aggregate inflation is a sum of several components. First, of the component mt, which is the
controlled part of monetary policy and it is an increasing function of money supply. Second,
4The appropriate production subsidy is 1/(θ − 1).
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of a contribution arising from fiscal policy gt; c > 0: an increase in government spending
financed by lump-sum taxes raises inflation. Third, of the term ωt that captures the effect of
technological shocks, past price changes and the expected future real marginal cost.5 Fourth
and last, of expected future inflation. The condition of rational expectations is
πet+1 = Ezt [π(zt+1)] ≡
∫
π(zt+1), (33)
where the integral is taken over the distribution of zt, and is four-dimensional since all the
components of zt are functions of four underlying stochastic structural parameters. In words,
πet+1 is the firms’ rational expectation of πt+1 as of time t.
Output is given by
yt = y˜t + agt + b(πt − βπ
e
t+1), (34)
where
y˜t = at, a =
1
1 + η
> 0, b =
1
λ(1 + η)
> 0.
The derivation of the coefficients is spelled out in Appendix B. The explanation of the
parameters in the output equation (34) is as follows: [1] y˜t is percentage deviation of the
natural rate of output at t from its steady-state value and it depends on the technological
shock. The natural rate of output is the level of production that arises in the economy with
steady-state monetary and fiscal policy; this is suboptimally low because of monopolistic
competition. [2] The scalar a is the direct effect of fiscal policy on GDP. An increase in
government spending raises demand and has an expansionary effect on GDP; hence a > 0.
[3] πet+1 is firms’ rational expectation of πt+1 as of time t. [4] The last term on the right-hand
side of equation (34) is the usual supply effect of an unexpected increase in inflation; thus
b > 0. [5] The overall effect of a fiscal expansion on output is a + bc > 0.
4 Preferences of Policymakers
The central bank chooses a policy variable mt, which stands for the base money supply, and
determines a component of inflation; thus higher mt means a more expansionary monetary
policy. The fiscal authority chooses a policy variable gt; a larger gt means higher government
spending and therefore a more expansionary fiscal policy. These policies affect the GDP level
yt and aggregate inflation πt in the country according to equations (34) and (32) above.
The fiscal authority is benevolent and chooses gt every period to maximize social welfare,
which is the utility of the representative individual. We approximate it by a second-order
Taylor series expansion to the level of expected utility of the representative consumer in the
rational expectations equilibrium associated with given monetary and fiscal policies – this
is shown in Appendix C. We are interested in the welfare effects of output and inflation
stabilization; for this reason, we consider the second-order approximation to the utility of
5This is shown in Appendix B.
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the representative household as α→ 0 and the direct welfare effect of public goods becomes
very small.
The fiscal authority minimizes the loss function
VF,t = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tUs, (35)
where the period utility Ut is approximated by
Ut = −ΩLF,t,
where Ω is a positive constant and LF,t is the quadratic loss function
LF,t =
1
2
[
(πt − πF )
2 + θF (yt − yF )
2 + 2δgt
]
. (36)
πF = 0 and it is socially optimal to minimize price level dispersion. The GDP that minimizes
social losses is yF , which is the GDP that would arise in an economy with flexible prices
and without monopolistic power by the firms; hence, yF ≥ y˜t and extra output is desirable.
Fiscal policy can raise output above its natural rate, but it creates social losses δ > 0 because
government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes that reduce private consumption. θF > 0
parameterizes the social preference for the output versus the inflation goals. All parameters
are spelled out in Appendix C.
Monetary policy is chosen by a monetary authority that is independent and conservative
in a way that encompasses both Rogoff’s and Svensson’s definition, and minimizes a loss
function
VM,t = Et
∞∑
s=t
βs−tLM,s, (37)
where
LM,t =
1
2
[
θM(yt − yM)
2 + (πt − πM)
2
]
, (38)
where yM is the output target, πM the inflation target and θM the preference for the output
versus the inflation goal for the monetary authority.
Sargent and Wallace (1981) show that inflation is a fiscal phenomenon if the central bank
cannot choose how much of the budget deficit to monetize. In models where fiscal policy is
absent or chosen non-strategically, welfare-maximizing discretionary monetary policy gen-
erates an inflation bias with no output gain because of its time-consistency problem. To
eliminate this inflation bias, Svensson (1997) suggests delegating monetary policy to a cen-
tral bank with an inflation target more conservative than society, i.e. with πM ≤ πF ; Rogoff
(1985a), on the other hand, suggests delegating monetary policy to a the central bank with a
greater concern for inflation than society, i.e. θM ≤ θF . These academic contributions have
played an important role in shaping monetary institutions in the last two decades. In recent
years, many countries have made their central banks increasingly independent of political
control and/or have instituted explicit inflation targeting regimes for their monetary policies.
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We take central bank independence and conservatism as a starting point of our analysis.
The monetary authority in our model has full control over monetary policy and does not
share the government budget constraint. The central bank is more conservative than society
in the sense that θM ≤ θF and/or πM ≤ 0, yM ≤ yF ; moreover, we choose the weights on the
output target and the inflation target in (38) optimally in the sense that they are consistent
with the second-best outcome – this is explained in greater detail in Section 6.
The natural rate of output y˜t, the scalar parameter a summarizing the fiscal policy effect
on GDP, the scalar parameter b for the supply effect of surprise inflation, the scalar parameter
c of the effect of fiscal policy on inflation, the scalar parameter δ for the deadweight loss of
fiscal policy, the scalar parameter θF for the social preferences, the efficient level of output
yF , the central bank’s output target yM and inflation target πM and the scalar parameter
θM for the central bank’s preferences, are all stochastic shocks because they depend on the
four stochastic preference and technology parameters of our structural model. We denote the
whole vector of these shocks by zt = (y˜t, a, b, c, δ, θF , yF , yM , πM , θM). The policy variablesmt
and gt are implemented after the shocks are observed, and therefore are written as functions
m(zt) and g(zt) (although the functional form may be fixed before the shocks are observed
in regimes where policies are precommitted). The resulting outcomes of GDP and inflation
are then also realization-specific or functions y(zt) and π(zt).
The literature in this area usually considers only linear policy rules – it restricts the form
of the function m(zt) to be linear, and then finds the optimal values of the coefficients in this
function. Since linear rules are not in general optimal, it becomes necessary to restrict the
stochastic shocks; only additive shocks like our y˜t are considered. Our stochastic structure
is richer and we allow m(zt) and g(zt) to be arbitrary, and find the fully optimal rules.
4.1 Timing of Actions
We will consider various possible policy regimes. In absence of commitment, the two policies
may be simultaneous (Nash) or one of them may be first (leadership). If monetary policy is
precommitted, then it has leadership with respect to setting the rule, and fiscal policy is the
follower in each state of the world (realization of the shocks); if fiscal policy is precommitted,
it has leadership with respect to setting the rule, and monetary policy is the follower in each
state of the world. There is no conclusive evidence about the correct choice from among
the possibilities. It may be argued on the one hand that the central bank’s reputational
considerations give it an advantage in making and keeping commitments, and on the other
hand that the lags in fiscal policy enable commitment there. Similar conflicting arguments
can be made for the order of moves under discretion. Therefore we consider all possibilities.
Hence, the timing of events is as follows:
1. We consider three possible scenarios of commitment:
(a) If there is joint commitment of the two policies, this is done in a coordinated
manner using the fiscal authority’s objective function, which coincides with social
welfare.
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(b) If the fiscal policy regime is one of commitment, the fiscal authority chooses its
policy rule g = g(zt); this specifies how fiscal policy will respond to the stochastic
shocks. If the fiscal regime is one of discretion, nothing happens at this step.
(c) If the monetary policy regime is one of commitment, the central bank chooses
its policy rule m = m(zt). If the monetary regime is one of discretion, nothing
happens at this step.
2. The stochastic shock vector zt is realized.
3. The private sector forms expectations πet+1.
4. (a) If the monetary policy regime is one of discretion, the central bank chooses mt. If
the monetary regime is one of commitment, the central bank simply implements
the monetary rule mt that was chosen at step 1.
(b) If the fiscal regime is one of discretion, the fiscal authority chooses fiscal policy gt.
If the fiscal regime is one of commitment, the fiscal authority simply implements
the fiscal rule gt that was chosen at step 1.
When monetary and fiscal policies are discretionary, the relative timing of step 4 (a)
and 4 (b) raises some questions. In fact, monetary and fiscal policies may be chosen
simultaneously or their order may be reversed.
We proceed to consider the different cases of commitment and sequence of moves.
5 Optimal Committed Policies
First we study the equilibrium with joint commitment of monetary and fiscal policies. This
is done when both authorities can precommit so as to minimize social losses. This delivers
the socially optimal and feasible allocation that we refer to as second best; hence, it is the
natural benchmark against which to compare all other equilibria.
Let both the monetary and fiscal authorities minimize the social loss function (35) and
recognize the rational expectations constraint. Since this is a separable problem, at step 1
the two authorities choose the whole functions m(·), g(·) to minimize
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
1
2
∫ [
π(zs)
2 + θF (y(zs)− yF )
2 + 2δg(zs)
]
. (39)
Substituting πet+1 into the objective complicates the algebra, because it then involves one
integration inside another. We avoid this by regarding the authorities as if they had another
choice variable, namely πet+1, but their choice was subject to the constraint (33). The common
Lagrangean for this problem is:
LJCF,t =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∫ {1
2
[
θF (y(zs)− yF )
2 + π(zs)
2 + 2δg(zs)
]
+ λcsπ(zs+1)
}
− λcsπ
e
s+1, (40)
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where λct is the Lagrangean multiplier. The first-order condition with respect to the function
g(zt) is given by (
π(zt) +
λct−1
β
)
c+ θF (a+ bc)(y(zt)− yF ) + δ = 0. (41)
The first-order condition with respect to the function m(zt) is given by(
π(zt) +
λct−1
β
)
+ θF b(y(zt)− yF ) = 0. (42)
The first-order condition with respect to πet+1 is given by
−λct +
∫
zt
θF (y(zt)− yF )bβ
(
−1 + γ +
1
1 + ψ
)
+ π(zt)β
(
γ +
1
1 + ψ
)
+
∫
zt−1
λct−1
β
β
(
γ +
1
1 + ψ
)
− [π(zt−1) + θF (y(zt−1)− yF )b] β
1
1 + ψ
+
∫
zt−2
λct−2
β
β
1
1 + ψ
. (43)
In deriving (43) we have taken into account that π(zt), y(zt), π(zt−1), π(zt−2) and y(zt−1) all
depend on πet+1. Using (42) and (41) we find
y(zt) = y˜t = yF −
δ
a θF
, (44)
which we can substitute back into (42) to obtain
π(zt) +
λct−1
β
=
δ b
a
. (45)
Using (45) and (44), the first-order condition (43) simplifies to
λct =
∫
zt
β
δb
a
, (46)
so that
π(zt) =
δ b
a
−
∫
zt
δb
a
. (47)
Notice that our monetary and fiscal rules are not a linear function of the shocks; the reason is
that even though the model is linear-quadratic, the stochastic shocks are not in general addi-
tive. If government spending did not create deadweight losses, i.e. δ = 0, joint commitment
would deliver the first best allocation
yt = yF , πt = πF = 0.
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Government spending, however, must be financed by current taxes and it therefore negatively
affects private consumption and social welfare.6
Joint commitment yields the second best. At the second best, there is no inflation bias;
public spending could raise output at its efficient level, but it is not optimal to do so. As α
becomes small and goes to zero, the “public good” effect of government spending disappears
while the negative impact of taxes on consumption and welfare remains. The output gap,
δ/(aθF ), is higher the larger the welfare cost of public spending δ, the less important is
output in social preferences θF , and the smaller the direct impact of fiscal policy on output
a.
The rational expectations constraint is binding when all the m, g are chosen ex-ante
optimally. More precisely, λct is the (discounted) average inflation reduction achieved the
next period by joint commitment.7
6 Discretionary Policies: Nash equilibrium
In this policy regime, after each realization of the stochastic shock vector zt, the fiscal au-
thority chooses gt, taking mt as given, so as to minimize the loss function LF,t; the monetary
authority chooses mt, taking gt as given, so as to minimize its loss function LM,t. The two
authorities act non-cooperatively and simultaneously; however, when their choices are made,
the private sector’s expectations πet+1, y
e
t+1 are fixed. After completing the analysis of the
policy equilibrium and economic outcome for an arbitrarily given state zt, we can find π
e
t+1
from the rational expectations condition (33).
The first-order condition for fiscal policy is obtained by differentiating (36) with respect
to gt, recognizing the dependence of πt on gt; this gives
πt = −θF
(
a
c
+ b
)
(yt − yF )−
δ
c
. (48)
This defines the reaction function of the fiscal authority (FRF) in the (yt, πt) space. One
can obtain the reaction function in terms of the policy variables (mt, gt) by substituting yt
and πt into (48) using (34) and (32). Since c > 0, FRF is negatively sloped.
The first-order condition for monetary policy is obtained by differentiating (38) with
respect to mt, which gives
πt = πM − θMb (yt − yM). (49)
This defines the reaction function for the monetary authority (MRF) in the (yt, πt) space.
Since b > 0, the MRF is negatively sloped.
The Nash equilibrium outcomes yt and πt are found by solving (48), (49) and (33) together
and the solution is given in Appendix D. Making use of (34) and (32) and (33), we can find
6Our qualitative findings would not be affected if we assumed that current government spending is deficit
financed because Ricardian equivalence holds in our setup. With non lump-sum taxes, however, the financing
of government spending would matter.
7In fact, δb/a is the bias in inflation that arises with discretionary monetary and fiscal policies. This
result is shown in Section 6.
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Figure 1: Nash Equilibrium
the policy variables mt and gt that emerge in the Nash equilibrium. This is also done in
Appendix D.
Figure 1 depicts the MRF (49) and the FRF (48) in the (yt, πt) space. The MRF is the
solid line through point M, the bliss point for the conservative monetary authority; FRF is
the solid line below point F, the bliss point for society and for the fiscal authority. With
δ > 0, FRF does not pass through point F because it is suboptimal to raise public spending
so as to raise output to yF . The second best allocation is point C, where yt = y˜ < yF and
πt = 0. It is easy to check that FRF is steeper than MRF. The Nash equilibrium occurs at
the intersection of the two reaction functions MRF and FRF, and it is labeled N. We denote
output and inflation at the Nash equilibrium by (yN , πN ).
When c > 0, the Nash equilibrium has the following characteristics:
yN > y˜, 0 > πN .
The Nash equilibrium does not coincide with the second best. In fact, the Nash equilibrium
has higher output and lower inflation than optimal. How the Nash equilibrium compares
with the goals of the two authorities depends on the preferences of the monetary authority
and on the realization of the shocks. Figure 1 depicts the case where the Nash equilibrium
is on the left of both point M and point F so that yN < yM = yF and 0 > πN > πM , namely
output is below and inflation is in between the goals of the authorities. However, it may well
be the case that the Nash equilibrium occurs on the right of point M; in this case the Nash
equilibrium is suboptimal and extreme because output is above and inflation below what
either authority wants.
A Nash equilibrium with high output and low inflation may sound good; however, output
is higher and inflation is lower than optimal. In words, household work too much in this
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equilibrium and they would happily substitute labor for leisure; at the same time, lower-
than-optimal inflation implies price dispersion that distorts consumption choices.
Why does the Nash equilibrium fail to achieve the second best? It is the time-inconsistency
of policies and the conflict of objectives between the policymakers. With some prices pre-
set, the fiscal authority runs a more expansionary fiscal policy than under joint commitment
because it believes this will boost demand and therefore output. In fact, FRF is on the right
of point C in Figure 1, which implies higher-than-optimal public spending. This incentive,
however, is perfectly anticipated by rational firms and it results in higher output and higher
inflation. The monetary authority of Figure 1 is appropriately conservative in the sense that
its monetary policy is consistent with the second best;8 higher-than-optimal public spend-
ing, however, raises output and inflation, which makes monetary policy more contractionary
than under joint commitment. Hence, at the Nash equilibrium output is higher and inflation
lower than at the second best.
If the central bank is not conservative and minimizes the loss function (36), then the
MRF is the dotted line through the first best, point F in Figure 1. In this case, the Nash
equilibrium would be:
yN = y˜ = yF −
δ
a θF
, πN = π˜ =
δb
a
. (51)
This is point A of Figure 1. The inflation bias, δ/(ba), is higher the stronger the time-
consistency problem of monetary (higher b) and fiscal policy (higher a and δ).
Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) find that the Nash equilibrium has output lower and prices
higher than optimal and than what either authority wants. Hence, their Nash equilibrium
is suboptimal and extreme, but in a different way than here. Their Nash equilibrium lies
above and to the left of point C in Figure 1, while our Nash equilibrium lies below and to
the right of point C. In Dixit and Lambertini, time inconsistency makes fiscal policy tighter
than optimal so that production subsidies are too low in the Nash equilibrium; since output
is lower than optimal, monetary policy is more expansionary than optimal, thereby raising
inflation above its optimal level. Fiscal policy works differently here: time inconsistency
makes fiscal policy more expansionary than optimal, thereby raising output and making
monetary policy tighter than optimal. As a result, the Nash equilibrium has higher output
and lower inflation than at the second best.
8Given the output goal yM and the weight on it θM , the central bank is appropriately conservative (so
that its policy is consistent with the second best) when
piM = pi
AC
M =
∫
θMb(y˜t − yM ). (50)
In drawing Figures 1, we have assumed θM = θF , yM = yF and piM = −δb/a.
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7 Discretionary Policies: Leadership Equilibria
Now we consider the case where monetary and fiscal policies are discretionary, that is, chosen
at step 4 without any commitment to a rule, but one of the policies is announced and fixed
before the other, so one policymaker is the leader and the other the follower in the two-move
subgame of step 4. It is not clear what leadership game describes reality better. On one
hand, people argue that monetary policy can be changed quite quickly while changes in fiscal
policy usually take a long time to be approved by the legislature; hence monetary policy has
first-mover advantage. On the other hand, one can argue that the fiscal budget is decided at
the beginning of the period while monetary policy is chosen afterward; hence, fiscal policy
has first-mover advantage. We consider both cases.
7.1 Monetary Leadership
Here we consider the case of monetary leadership. Monetary policy is chosen at step 4 (a);
when fiscal policy is chosen at step 4 (b), mt is known. Private sector’s expectations π
e
t+1
are set before and known when mt and gt are chosen.
Fiscal policy is exactly as described in Section 6. The fiscal authority minimizes (36) with
respect to gt taking mt and π
e
t+1 as given. Hence, the fiscal authority’s reaction function is
still described by (48).
The monetary authority minimizes the loss function (38) with respect to mt taking into
account the reaction function of the fiscal authority. We can use (48) and the defining
equations (34), (32) to solve for the fiscal response gt in terms of mt, and substitute back
into (34) and (32) to find yt and πt as functions of mt incorporating the fiscal reaction. This
gives
πt = πM +
θM
θF ( b+ a/c)
(yt − yM). (52)
The outcome under monetary leadership is then found by solving (52) and the fiscal reaction
equation (48) jointly. This gives the solution for yt and πt, whose derivation is spelled out
in Appendix E.
Figure 2 depicts the monetary leadership equilibrium. MRFL is the first-order condition
(52), which defines an upward-sloping line through point M because a + bc > 0. This looks
quite different from the first-order condition under Nash, MRF, which is downward sloping.
The reason is that the central bank now anticipates the reaction of the fiscal authority.
Graphically, MRFL is the locus of the tangency points of the central bank’s iso-loss ellipses
and FRF. Monetary leadership equilibrium occurs at the intersection of MRFL and FRF,
which is point ML. In the monetary leadership equilibrium output is higher and inflation
lower than in the Nash equilibrium. The monetary authority knows that the fiscal authority
prefers higher inflation and it therefore contracts policy more than under Nash; this lowers
output and inflation, causing a stronger expansion of public spending than under Nash.
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7.2 Fiscal Leadership
Now we consider the case of fiscal leadership. After the shocks are realized, the government
acts first and chooses gt; with gt fixed, the monetary authority choosesmt. As usual, we solve
this game by backward induction; we start from the last-moving player, the government, and
we then consider the first-moving one, the monetary authority.
The central bank minimizes the loss function (38) with respect to monetary policy mt
with firms’ expectations and fiscal policy already fixed; hence, the first-order condition is
exactly the MRF (49) of Section 6.
The fiscal authority minimizes the loss function (36) with respect to gt, subject to the
MRF (49). The first-order condition for fiscal leadership is:
πt =
θF
θM b
(yt − yF ) +
δ(1 + θMb
2)
θM b a
. (53)
The outcome is then found by solving the MRF (49) and the fiscal first-order condition (53)
together. This gives the solution for yt and πt that we derive in Appendix F.
The first-order condition (53) defines an upward sloping line FRFL passing through point
A of Figure 3 that can be steeper or flatter than FRF depending on the realization of the
stochastic parameters. Hence, fiscal leadership has lower output and higher inflation than
Nash.
Why would a government with first-mover advantage choose an equilibrium with lower
output and higher inflation than Nash? Ex-post, namely once private expectations are set,
the fiscal authority prefers fiscal leadership over Nash: a discretionary fiscal authority with
first-mover advantage chooses the allocation along the MRF that minimizes social losses.
Since these allocations include the Nash equilibrium, fiscal leadership is necessarily preferred,
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at least weakly, over Nash from an ex-post point of view. The fiscal authority with first-
mover advantage anticipates that the central bank has a lower inflation goal and runs a
tighter fiscal policy than under Nash to avoid a contractionary monetary policy; as a result,
fiscal policy is tigher and monetary policy looser than under Nash, making output lower and
inflation higher than under Nash.
7.3 Discretionary Regimes: a Welfare Comparison
What discretionary regime performs best in terms of social welfare? This section addresses
this issue by comparing social welfare under the discretionary regimes (Nash, monetary
and fiscal leadership) from an ex-ante point of view. We are going to run a Monte Carlo
simulation of the structural model to obtain the paramaters of the log-linearized model. In
fact, different draws of the four underlying stochastic parameters d, θ, η, A necessarily imply
changes in the elements of the vector z, which are jointly distributed. Our steady state
is calibrated using parameter values typically used in the literature; these are summarized
in Appendix G; also, see Gal´ı (2001) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000). We then
assume preference shocks that deliver output fluctuations within the range of +/- 6 percent
of steady-state output, which are roughly consistent with the fluctuations of U.S. output
around a quadratic trend.9
Table 1 reports the outcome of our comparison among discretionary regimes. We take
4,000 random draws of the stochastic parameters d, θ, η, A and, for each draw, we simulate
our economy under joint commitment and under the three discretionary regimes: Nash, fiscal
leadership and monetary leadership. The first two columns show the comparison between
9See Appendix G for details.
21
Fiscal Leadership Monetary Leadership Nash versus
versus Nash versus Fiscal Leadership Monetary Leadership
average output average output average output
(LNF − L
FL
F ) equivalent (L
FL
F − L
ML
F ) equivalent (L
ML
F − L
N
F ) equivalent
Bench- 0.0106 -0.57 -0.0116 -0.74 -0.0009 0.58
mark (4.1113) (-14.7917) (-0.3537)
low 0.005 -0.31 -0.0097 -0.74 0.0048 1.32
πM (3.1193) (-15.0963) (2.8468)
low 0.0012 -0.08 -0.0026 -0.21 -0.0014 1.13
θM (3.178) (-8.4513) (-3.1428)
Note: FL: fiscal leadership, N: Nash, ML: monetary leadership
Table 1: Welfare Comparison among Discretionary Regimes
fiscal leadership and Nash. The first column reports the average difference in social losses
between Nash and fiscal leadership; the figure in parentheses is the associated t−statistic
indicating whether the difference is statistically significant. The second column reports
the output-equivalent difference in welfare between fiscal leadership and Nash; this is the
percentage change in output in the better-performing regime that is necessary to make social
losses equal to those under the worse-performing regime, leaving inflation and government
spending unchanged.10
In the benchmark economy the central bank is appropriately conservative (as defined
in Section 6) with the same weight and target for output as the fiscal authority, namely
θM = θF and yM = yF . In this economy, output is highest and inflation lowest under
monetary leadership while output is lowest and inflation highest under fiscal leadership.
Both Nash and monetary leadership are more expansionary in terms of output than optimal;
fiscal leadership, on the other hand, is contractionary. Inflation is below optimal under Nash
and monetary leadership and above optimal under fiscal leadership.
Fiscal leadership is the best discretionary regime from an ex-ante point of view. Time
inconsistency leads to excessive public spending in the Nash equilibrium. But the government
with first-mover advantage anticipates that a strong fiscal expansion will be met by a strong
monetary tightening because the central bank is inflation-conservative; as a result, fiscal
policy is expanded less than under Nash. Output should fall by 0.57 percent in the fiscal
leadership equilibrium for this regime to be welfare-equivalent to Nash. Monetary leadership
and Nash deliver similar output-inflation combinations and social welfare is not significantly
different under the two regimes.
The second row reports the results of the simulation for the same 4,000 draws of the
benchmark economy assuming that the central bank is more inflation-conservative than
10More precisely, leaving inflation and fiscal policy unchanged, we calculate: a) the certainty-equivalent
output in the better-performing regime; b) the certainty-equivalent output in the better-performing regime
that is necessary to make social losses equal to those in the worse-performing regime. Table 1 reports the
percentage difference between these two output measures.
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appropriate: the inflation target for the central bank is 20 percent lower than its appropriate
level, πM = 0.8 ∗ π
AC
M . Because the central bank has a more conservative inflation target,
the discretionary equilibria have lower inflation than in the benchmark economy. Fiscal
leadership is still the best performing discretionary regime from an ex-ante point of view
and monetary leadership is outperformed by Nash; in fact, output should increase by 1.32
percent for the Nash equilibrium to be welfare-equivalent to monetary leadership.
The last row of table 1 shows the results of the simulation when the central bank has a
lower weight on the output target than the fiscal authority does. More precisely, yM = yF and
πM = −δb/a but θM = θF/3. The weight-conservativeness of the monetary authority lowers
inflation in the Nash equilibrium but raises inflation in the monetary leadership one. The
central bank with leadership anticipates that the fiscal authority will expand fiscal policy in
response to monetary tightenings and therefore runs a more expansionary policy than under
Nash. As a result, monetary leadership is now welfare-superior to Nash. Fiscal leadership
remains the best-performing discretionary regime.
The results of this section can be summarized as follows. Fiscal leadership is the best-
performing discretionary regime because leadership diminishes the time-consistency problem
of fiscal leadership that generates higher-than-optimal public spending. Monetary leadership
and Nash do not restrain fiscal policy and lead to higher social losses; their ranking depends
on the central bank’s preferences.
8 Committed Policies
8.1 Monetary Commitment
Here we analyze the case where the central bank credibly commits to a monetary rule at
step 1 of the game while fiscal policy is chosen discretionary at step 4. Once the shocks
are realized, monetary policy is fully predictable even if it has not been taken yet. The
government acts knowing what monetary policy will be and it is therefore a follower, even if
its action may come before that of the central bank in calendar time.
One would think that first-mover advantage and pre-commitment to a rule would deliver
a better outcome for the central bank than first-mover advantage only; but this is not the
case. Monetary commitment turns out to be equivalent to monetary leadership for every
realization of the shocks. Hence, the advantage of monetary commitment is eliminated by
fiscal discretion. With fiscal policy discretionary, the FRF of the government acts as a
constraint on the monetary authority and the best the central bank can do for itself is to act
as a leader state-by-state and ensure the equivalent of first-mover advantage, if that exists,
in the game at step 4.
This game is solved by backward induction. At step 4 (b), the government minimizes its
loss function (36) with respect to gt knowing what mt is or will be; hence, the government’s
behavior is described by the FRF (48) of Section 6. We can solve for fiscal policy as a function
of the shocks, the monetary rule and the firms’ expectations by substituting equations (34)
and (32) into (48) and then solving for output and inflation that take into account the
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government’s reaction function. This is done in Appendix H.
At step 1, the monetary authority chooses the whole function m(·) to minimize
1
2
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∫ [
θM(y(zs)− yM)
2 + (π(zs)− πM)
2
]
, (54)
where y(zt), π(zt) and π
e
t+1 are given by (H.26), (H.27), and (33) respectively. Once again,
rather then substituting πet+1 directly into the objective, we regard the monetary authority
as having an additional choice variable, πet+1, subject to the constraint (33). The Lagrangean
for this problem is
LMt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∫ {
1
2
[
θM (y(zs)− yM)
2 + (π(zs)− πM)
2
]
+ λmt π(zs+1)
}
− λms π
e
s+1, (55)
where λmt is the Lagrangean multiplier.
The first-order condition with respect to the function m(zt) is given by
θM (y(zt)− yM)− θF
(
a
c
+ b
)(
π(zt)− πM +
λmt−1
β
)
= 0. (56)
The first-order condition with respect to πet+1 is given by
−λmt +
∫
zt
β
[
−θM (y(zt)− yM) +
(
π(zt)− πM +
λmt−1
β
)
θF
Ω
(
a
c
+ b
)] [
b+
a
c
(
γ +
1
1 + ψ
)]
+
(57)
1
β
∫
zt−1
[
−θM (y(zt−1)− yM) +
(
π(zt−1)− πM +
λmt−2
β
)
θF
Ω
(
a
c
+ b
)]
β
a
c
1
1 + ψ
= 0,
where
Ω =
1
c [θF (b+ a/c)2 + 1]
.
Using (56), the first-order condition (57) simplifies to
λmt = 0,
for all t. The rational expectations constraint is on the borderline of not binding. Using
λmt = 0, (56) becomes
(y(zt)− yM)−
θF
θM
(
a
c
+ b
)
(π(zt)− πM ) = 0, (58)
which is equivalent to (52), the first-order condition formt in the case where monetary policy
is discretionary with monetary leadership. The outcome for each realization of the shocks
can be found by solving (58) together with (48), which is done in Appendix E. The outcome
under monetary commitment is therefore exactly the same as the outcome under monetary
discretion with monetary leadership for every realization of the shocks.
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This is also the finding in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b). In fact, this result does not
depend on the specifics of fiscal policy. The point is that discretionary fiscal policy eliminates
the gains of monetary commitment. With discretionary fiscal policy, monetary commitment
must lie on the fiscal reaction function and, as long as the fiscal reaction function is not
vertical, a reduction in inflation is necessarily accompanied by a change in output. In our
case, a fall in inflation is accompanied by an increase in GDP because the FRF is negatively
sloped. But the monetary authority, even if it can commit, does not want to pursue a policy
any tighter than that chosen under discretion with monetary leadership; in fact, inflation
is already below the central bank’s goal with discretionary monetary leadership. But this
implies that the monetary authority has no incentive to influence expectations (relative to
what they are in the discretionary solution with monetary leadership) either. Thus, the
Lagrangean multiplier on expectations is just equal to zero.
This result has important implications for the design of central banks. Recent policy
discussions have put a lot of emphasis on monetary commitment. Our work shows that
monetary commitment combined with fiscal discretion will not bring any reduction of infla-
tion with respect to the case of discretionary monetary leadership.
Monetary commitment is equivalent to discretionary monetary leadership if the central
bank does not internalize the welfare losses created by fiscal policy, i.e. the cental bank’s loss
function does not include the term 2δgt. If that were the case, however, the optimal monetary
rule would recognize the time inconsistency of fiscal policy and it would pursue a more
expansionary monetary policy than under monetary leadership to induce a less expansionary
fiscal policy.
8.2 Fiscal Commitment
Now we consider the case where fiscal policy is committed at step 1 whereas monetary policy
is discretionary and chosen at step 4 (a). The way to solve this case is the same as in the
previous section for monetary commitment, except that fiscal policy is now committed and
leader while monetary policy is discretionary and follower.
The monetary authority minimizes the loss function (38) with respect to mt with gt and
πet+1 fixed. The first-order condition with respect to mt is, once again, the MRF (49). Then,
one can solve for monetary policy as a function of the stochastic shocks, the fiscal rule and
private sector’s expectations by substituting (34) and (32) into (49), and then output and
inflation, as of step 1 and taking into account the choice of the monetary authority. This is
done in detail in Appendix I.
The Lagrangean for the problem of the fiscal authority is as follows:
LFt =
∞∑
s=t
βs−t
∫ {1
2
[
θF (y(zs)− yF )
2 + π(zs)
2 + 2δg(zs)
]
+ λfsπ(zs+1)
}
− λfsπ
e
s+1, (59)
where λft is the Lagrangean multiplier, y(zt), π(zt) and π
e
t+1 are given by (I.29), (I.30) and
(33), respectively.
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The first-order condition with respect to the function g(zt) is given by
(y(zt)− yF )θF −
(
π(zt) +
λft−1
β
)
θMb+
δ
a
(1 + θMb
2) = 0. (60)
The first-order condition with respect to πet+1 is given by
−λft +
∫
zt
−
bβ
1 + θMb2
[−θF (yt(z)− yF )] +
(
π(zt) +
λt−1
β
)
b2βθM
1 + θMb2
= 0. (61)
Using (60), the first-order condition (61) simplifies to
λft =
∫
zt
β
δb
a
> 0. (62)
Using (60), (49) and (62), one can solve for output and inflation; this is done in Appendix I.
As in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b), fiscal commitment leads to a reduction in inflation
even if monetary policy is discretionary. Technically, the Lagrangean multiplier of the ratio-
nal expectations constraint λft is positive and exactly equal to λ
c
t of equation (46) for the case
of joint commitment. Because the fiscal authority is benevolent and cares about the welfare
losses caused by public spending, fiscal commitment eliminates the time inconsistency of
fiscal policy; and because the fiscal authority has first-mover advantage, it anticipates the
reaction of the central bank and therefore eliminates the time inconsistency of monetary
policy too! In fact, if the central bank is appropriately conservative as defined in Section 6,
fiscal commitment with monetary discretion delivers the second best.
Notice that fiscal commitment is equivalent to fiscal leadership for all realization of shocks
without time inconsistency of fiscal policy. The first-order condition with fiscal commitment
(60) is the same as the first-order condition with fiscal leadership (53) except for the term
λft−1, which is the inflation bias stemming from time inconsistency at yt = y˜. Figure 4
shows the equilibrium with fiscal commitment and the equilibrium with fiscal leadership.
The first-order condition with discretionary fiscal leadership FRFL goes through point A;
FCOM, the first-order condition with commitment, is parallel to FRFL but shifted down by
λft−1, the Lagrangean multiplier of the rational expectations constraint. Fiscal commitment
occurs at the intersection of FCOM and MRF; this is the second best when the central bank
is appropriately conservative, as depicted in Figure 4.
9 Optimal Design of Monetary and Fiscal Institutions
Commitment to a policy rule is difficult in practice. This raises the question of how monetary
and fiscal institutions should be designed to guarantee optimal macroeconomic stabilization
when policies are discretionary. We find that two different designs can achieve that: Identical
goals and complete separation.
One optimal design calls for both authorities to share identical targets. This makes a lot of
sense as conflicting goals lead to bad interactions between monetary and fiscal policies. Since
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both policies suffer a time-consistency problem, the inflation goal should be appropriately
conservative; the output goal, on the other hand, should be the socially efficient GDP level.
To be more precise, the monetary and fiscal authorities should share the period loss function:
L˜F,t =
1
2
[
(πt − π˜F )
2 + θF (yt − yF )
2 + 2δgt
]
,
with
π˜F = −
δb
a
.
The Nash equilibrium as well as any leadership equilibria deliver the second best. Intuitively,
this design of monetary and fiscal authorities shifts the bliss point of the government from F
to M and makes the central bank internalize the welfare losses stemming from fiscal policy.
This is shown in Figure 5.
The alternative design commands a complete separation of goals between monetary and
fiscal policies. The logical division of labor calls for the central bank to care only about
inflation and for the government to care only about output and the welfare losses stemming
from public spending. More precisely, the central bank’s period loss function should be
L∗M,t =
1
2
π2t . (63)
With Nash or monetary leadership, the fiscal authority should minimize the period loss
function
L∗NF,t =
1
2
[
θF (yt − y
∗
F )
2 + 2δgt
]
, (64)
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where
y∗F = yF −
δb
aθF (a/c+ b)
< yF .
Intuitively, the output target of the government must be appropriately conservative to elimi-
nate the (expansionary) bias stemming from time inconsistency of fiscal policy. The equilib-
rium is shown in Figure 6: the MRF becomes the horizontal line πt = 0, the FRF becomes
the vertical line yt = y˜t, and their intersection is point C, which is the Nash and monetary
leadership equilibrium.
If fiscal policy has leadership over monetary policy, the fiscal authority’s period loss
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function should be
L∗FLF,t =
1
2
[
θF (yt − yF )
2 + 2δgt
]
. (65)
The government with first-mover advantage anticipates that the central bank is ultraconser-
vative and that any expansion of public spending that brings inflation above zero is met by
a monetary contraction to bring inflation back to zero. Hence, fiscal leadership coupled with
the fact that the central bank is ultraconservative eliminates the time inconsistency of fiscal
policy.
10 Concluding Comments
Monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on GDP and inflation; at the same
time, both policies suffer a time-inconsistency problem. If the central bank is more conser-
vative than the fiscal authority, the non-cooperative game among them can result in a Nash
equilibrium that is suboptimal and possibly more extreme than the goals of either authority.
Fiscal leadership improves welfare over Nash not only ex-post but also ex-ante; however,
leadership equilibria fail to deliver the second best.
Much emphasis has been put lately on the benefits of monetary pre-commitment to
a rule that specifies the policy action to be taken as a function of the realization of the
shock. The merits of commitment to a monetary rule are well understood from models
that consider monetary policy in isolation. Our work shows that fiscal discretion destroys
monetary commitment: monetary commitment is negated by the fact that the monetary
rule must recognize the fiscal reaction function as a constraint in each state of the world. In
fact, monetary commitment is equivalent to monetary leadership in each state of the world.
These findings have important implications for the design of monetary and fiscal institu-
tions. Commitment is useful only if it can be extended to both monetary and fiscal policies.
If fiscal policy is discretionary, it is not worth putting in place any mechanisms of monetary
commitment. If monetary policy is discretionary, fiscal commitment is useful but only if the
central bank’s preferences are specified so that monetary policy is consistent with the second
best.
If monetary and fiscal policies are discretionary, then welfare gains can be achieved by
appropriately assigning output-inflation goals to the policymakers. Such assignment should
eliminate any conflict of objectives among the monetary and fiscal authorities and, at the
same time, it should eliminate the bias stemming from time inconsistency. Hence, the
monetary and fiscal authorities should either have identical output and inflation goals, with
the inflation goal appropriately conservative, or they should have separate goals, with the
central bank caring only about inflation and the government caring only about output and
the welfare losses due to fiscal policy.
Many countries have recently made their central banks increasingly independent of the
treasuries and accountable for their inflation outcomes. We have accordingly assumed central
bank independence and we regard cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities
as unrealistic and in contrast with recent institutional reforms.
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Changes in the degree of price inertia affect our results in a number of ways. A higher de-
gree of price stickyness worsens the time-consistency problem of monetary and fiscal policies.
To attain the second-best outcome when the authorities have identical goals, the inflation
target needs to be more conservative; if the authorities have separate goals and play Nash
or monetary policy has leadership, the outcome target for the fiscal authority needs to be
made more conservative.
Having public spending financed by fiscal deficits would leave our results unchanged
because we have assumed that taxes are lump sum and Ricardian equivalence holds. That
would not be the case with distortionary taxation. This is an interesting extension that we
leave to future work.
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Appendix
A Optimal Price
The maximization problem of a firm is
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−tEtQt,sΠs(i). (A.1)
The first-order condition with respect Pt(i) is
(θ − 1)Et
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−tQt,sYs
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−θ
= θEt
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−tQt,sYs
Ws
AsPs
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)
−θ−1
.
Let P˜t ≡ Pt(i)/Pt and notice that all new prices are equal; the first-order condition can be
rewritten as
P˜t(θ − 1)Et
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−tQt,sYsΠ
s
v=t+1Π
θ
v = θEt
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−tQt,sYs
Ws
AsPs
Πsv=t+1Π
1+θ
v , (A.2)
where Πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate. Notice that the steady state value of P˜ is
P˜ =
θ
θ − 1
W
AP
.
The relative price is a mark-up over the real marginal cost. Log-linearization of (A.2) around
its steady state value gives
p˜t
1− φβ
= Et
∞∑
s=t
(φβ)s−t

ws − as − ps + s∑
v=t+1
πv

 , (A.3)
where small letters indicate the percentage deviation of the capital variable from its steady-
state value, i.e. at ≡ (At −A)/A. Notice that (A.3) can be rewritten as
p˜t = (1− φβ)(wt − at − pt) + φβEt(πt+1 + p˜t+1). (A.4)
Log-linearizing (30) gives
p˜t =
φ
1− φ
πt, (A.5)
which can be substituted into (A.4) to obtain
πt = λ(wt − at − pt) + βEtπt+1, λ =
(1− φβ)(1− φ)
φ
. (A.6)
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B Log Linearization around the Steady State
This section log linearizes around the steady state and solves for aggregate inflation and
output. Log-linearizing the first-order condition with respect to labor (10) we obtain
nt =
1
η
(wt − pt − ct), (B.7)
where, as usual, small letters indicate percent deviations from the steady state of the
capitalized-letter variable. Also notice that (15) implies
yt = at + nt. (B.8)
Substituting this into (B.8) and (B.7) into (A.6) we obtain
yt = at +
1
1 + η
gt +
1
λ(1 + η)
(πt − βπ
e
t+1), (B.9)
which is equation (34) in the text.
Log-linearization of the demand for real balances (8) delivers
µt + βi
e
t+1 = ct + pt, (B.10)
where µt is the percent deviation of money supply Mt from its steady state value. Using the
Euler equation (7) we find
iet+1 =
1
1− β
Et(ct+1 − ct + πt+1). (B.11)
We consider i.i.d shocks; using the resource constraint and substituting the result above into
(B.10) we obtain
yt = (1− β)µt + β(y
e
t+1 + π
e
t+1) + gt − (1− β)pt, (B.12)
which we then substitute into (B.9) to obtain
πt =
λ(1 + η)
1 + (1− β)λ(1 + η)
[−at + (1− β)(µt − pt−1) + βy
e
t+1]+ (B.13)
λη
1 + (1− β)λ(1 + η)
gt + β
1 + λ(1 + η)
1 + (1− β)λ(1 + η)
πet+1,
which is equation (32) in the text. Notice that
yet+1 =
1
λ(1 + η)
(πet+1 − βπ
e
t+2) =
1
1 + η
Et(wt+1 − pt+1 − at+1).
In words, current inflation depends on current policies, monetary and fiscal, on the current
technological shock, on expected future inflation as well as the expected future real marginal
cost of producing.
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C Social Welfare Function
We follow Woodford (2003) and consider a second-order Taylor series approximation to the
objective
Ut = u(Ct; ǫt)−
∫ 1
0
v(Nt(i); ǫt)di+ αx(Gt; ǫt) (C.14)
with
u(Ct; ǫt) = logCt, v(Nt(i); ǫt) =
(
d
1 + η
)
Nt(i)
1+η, x(Gt; ǫt) =
1
1− 1/ρ
G
1−1/ρ
t .
The approximation is made around the steady-state level of output Y for each good and
the mean values for the exogenous shocks. Here we derive the welfare criterion that applies
to a limiting cashless economy and therefore we abstract from the welfare consequences of
monetary frictions.
We will proceed briefly; for details, see Woodford (2003). Let ǫt = (d, η, θ, At) denote the
complete vector of preference and technological shocks that we normalize so that E(ǫt) = 0
and let a ¯ denote steady-state value and, for simplicity, we drop time subscripts; a second-
order expansion of the first and last term on the right-hand side of (C.14) is given by
u¯+uCC˜t+uǫǫt+
1
2
uCCC˜
2
t+
1
2
ǫ
′
tuǫǫǫt+uCǫC˜tǫt+α
[
x¯+ xGG˜t + xǫǫt +
1
2
uGGG˜
2
t +
1
2
ǫ
′
tuǫǫǫt + uGǫG˜tǫt
]
,
where C˜t ≡ Ct− C¯t and G˜t ≡ Gt − G¯t. At the steady state, C¯ = Y¯ − G¯. We assume that G˜
is small enough, specifically of order O(||ǫ||2). After using Taylor expansion
Yt
Y¯
= 1 + Yˆt +
Yˆ 2t
2
,
where Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ) (and similarly for other variables) and neglecting terms that are of
order O(||ǫ||3) or higher) order, we obtain
u(Ct; ǫt)+αx(Gt; ǫt) = Y¯ uC
(
Yˆt +
1
2
Yˆ 2t
)
−uCG˜t+
1
2
uCC Y¯
2Yˆ 2t +uCǫǫtY¯ Yˆt+αxGG˜t+αuGǫǫtG˜t.
(C.15)
Let
st ≡ −
uCǫǫt
uCC Y¯
,
1
σ
≡ −
Y¯ uCC
uC
,
where st is of order O(||ǫ||). Taking the limit as α→ 0, (C.15) simplifies to
u(Ct; ǫt) + αx(Gt; ǫt) = Y¯ uC
[
Yˆt
(
1 +
st
σ
)
+
1
2
Yˆ 2t
(
1−
1
σ
)
−
Gt
Y¯
]
. (C.16)
A second-order Taylor expansion of each v(Nt(i); ǫ), using the fact that Nt(i) = Yt(i)/At,
gives
Y¯ (i)vY
{
Yˆt(i)
(
1 +
vY ǫǫ
vY
)
+
Yˆt(i)
2
2
(
1 +
vY Y Y¯
vY
)}
. (C.17)
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Let
qt ≡ −
vY ǫǫt
vY Y Y¯
,
where qt is of order O(||ǫ||). Since vY Y Y¯ /vY = η, we have that∫ 1
0
v(Nt(i); ǫt)di = Y¯ vY
[
EYˆt(i) +
1 + η
2
(EYˆt(i)
2 + varYˆt(i))− ηqtEYˆt(i)
]
. (C.18)
Using the Taylor series approximation
Yˆ = EYˆt(i) +
1
2
θ − 1
θ
varYˆt(i),
with
varYˆt(i) = θ
2var logPt(i) = θ
2 φ
1− φ
π2t ,
where πt ≡ pt − pt−1 and substituting these expressions in (C.17) also using
vY
uC
=
θ − 1
θ
,
which is the monopolistic distortions that we assume to be of order O(||ǫ||), we obtain
∫ 1
0
v(Nt(i); ǫt)di = Y¯ uC
{(
1− ηqt −
θ − 1
θ
)
Yˆt +
1 + η
2
Yˆ 2t +
1
2
θ2
φ
1− φ
(
η +
θ − 1
θ
)
π2t
}
.
(C.19)
Next, we subtract (C.19) from (C.15) we obtain that Ut is approximated by
−
Y¯ uC
2
{
Yˆ 2t
(
η +
1
σ
)
− 2Yˆt
(
ηqt +
st
σ
+
θ − 1
θ
)
+ 2
Gt
Y¯
+ θ2
φ
1− φ
(
η +
θ − 1
θ
)
π2t
}
.
Notice that σ = 1 with u(C) = logC. The output terms above (together with a constant)
come from the term [Yˆt − Yˆ
n
t − log(Y
∗
t /Y¯ )]
2, where Yˆ nt = log(Y
n
t − Y¯ ), where Y
n
t is the
equilibrium level of output at t under complete price flexibility. Let yt be gap between
current output and output under complete flexibility, i.e. steady-state output, and let yF be
the gap between steady-state and efficient output. We can write
Ut = −ΩLF,t,
where
LF,t =
1
2
[
π2t + θF (yt − yF,t)
2 + 2δgt
]
, (C.20)
where
Ω =
φθ[θ(1 + η)− 1]
1− φ
> 0, θF =
(1 + η)
Ω
> 0,
δ =
1
Ω
> 0, yF = log
Y ∗
Y¯
= −
1
1 + η
log
θ − 1
θ
.
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Social welfare is lower: a) the larger the gap between actual and the efficient level of output;
b) the higher price dispersion that materializes with changes in the price level; c) the larger
public spending.
Finally, we briefly discuss the case where α > 0. In this case, government spending
is a public good that raises social welfare directly. A benevolent fiscal authority chooses
government spending according to the first-order condition (14); steady-state output is
Y¯ =
[
(1 + α)(θ − 1)
dθ
] 1
1+η
.
As long as α < θ/(θ − 1), steady-state output is below efficiency and there is an output
gap that fiscal policy can close but at the cost of over-providing the public good. Ut is
approximated by
−
Y¯ uC
2
{
Yˆ 2t
(
η +
1
σ
)
− 2Yˆt
(
ηqt +
st
σ
+
θ − 1
θ
)
+ θ2
φ
1− φ
(
η +
θ − 1
θ
)
π2t
}
,
but [Yˆt − log(Y
∗
t /Y¯ )]
2 = yˆ2 − 2 Yˆ
1+η
log (1+α)(θ−1)
θ
+ constant term = −2 α
1+η
Gˆ if α is small.
The period social loss function is as (C.20) with
δ =
α
Ω
> 0, gt ≡ Gˆt.
D Nash equilibrium
Written in matrix notation, we have[
θF (b+ a/c) 1
θMb 1
] [
yt
πt
]
=
[
θF (b+ a/c) yF − δ/c
πM + θM b yM
]
The determinant of the matrix on the left hand side is
Ω ≡ θF (
a
c
+ b)− θMb.
Then the solution exists as long as Ω is different from zero, which is the case almost surely
(for probability one of realizations of shocks). The solution is given by[
yt
πt
]
= −
1
Ω
[
1 −1
−θM b θF (b+ a/c)
]
×
[
+θF (b+ a/c) yF − δ/c
πM + θM b yM
]
(D.21)
Write (34) and (32) also in vector-matrix notation:[
a+ bc b
c 1
] [
gt
mt
]
=
[
yt − y˜t + b π
e
t+1
πt − ωt − γβπ
e
t+1
]
This has the solution[
gt
mt
]
=
1
a
[
1 −b
−c a + bc
] [
yt − y˜t + b π
e
t+1
πt − ωt − γβπ
e
t+1
]
(D.22)
The values of g,mt can then be obtained substituting yt, πt from (D.21).
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E Monetary Leadership
Written in vector-matrix notation, we have[
θM −θF (b+ a/c)
θF (b+ a/c) 1
] [
yt
πt
]
=
[
θM yM − θF (b+ a/c) πM
θF (b+ a/c) yF − δ/c
]
This has the solution[
yt
πt
]
=
1
θM + θ2F (b+ a/c)
2
[
1 θF (b+ a/c)
−θF (b+ a/c) θM
]
(E.23)
×
[
θM yM − θF (b+ a/c) πM
θF (b+ a/c) yF − δ/c
]
The values of g,mt can then be obtained substitituting from (E.23) in (D.22).
F Fiscal Leadership
Written in vector-matrix notation, we have[
θMb 1
−θF θM b
] [
yt
πt
]
=
[
θM b yM + πM
−θF yF + θM b + δ(1 + θM b
2)/a
]
This has the solution [
yt
πt
]
=
θM b
θ2M b
2 + θF
[
θMb −1
θF θM b
]
(F.24)
×
[
θM b yM + πM
−θF yF + θM b + δ(1 + θM b
2)/a
]
G Simulation
We assume the mean of the parameter η to be 1, which implies a unit wage elasticity of labor
supply in the steady state. φ = 0.5; under the Calvo formulation this implies an average
price duration of two quarters, which is in line with econometric estimates of the parameter
as well as with survey evidence. The elasticity of substitution θ is set to be 11 on average,
which is consistent with a 10% steady-state markup. The discount parameter β is set equal
to .98. The mean of the parameter d is set to be equal to 1. This parameter is usually
pinned down to match the labor share of income, which is equal to one in our setting; hence,
the mean value of d is inconsequential here. The technological shock at is assumed to have
zero mean. We then assume that the preference parameters d, θ, η and technology A are
stochastic, i.i.d. with lognormal distribution with means as specified above. Their variances
are calibrated to get output fluctuations in the range of +/- 6% of steady-state output, which
are consistent with the fluctuations of U.S. output around a quadratic trend.
37
H Monetary Commitment
Substituting (34) and (32) into (48), we obtain
g(zt) =
1
c [θF (b+ a/c)2 + 1]
{
−
[
θF b
(
a
c
+ b
)
+ 1
] [
m(zt) + ωt + γβπ
e
t+1
]
−θF
(
a
c
+ b
) [
y˜t − yF − b π
e
t+1
]
−
δ
c
}
. (H.25)
Output and inflation, as of step 1 and taking into account the choice of the fiscal authority
at step 4 (b), are
y(zt) =
1
θF (b+ a/c)2 + 1
{
−
a
c
[
m(zt) + ωt + γβπ
e
t+1
]
+ y˜t − b βπ
e
t+1+ (H.26)
θF
(
a
c
+ b
)2 [
yF −
δ/c
θF (a/c+ b)
]}
,
and
π(zt) =
1
θF (b+ a/c)2 + 1
{
θF
a
c
(
a
c
+ b
) [
m(zt) + ωt + γβπ
e
t+1
]
− (H.27)
θF
(
a
c
+ b
)
[y˜t − yF − bβπ
e
t+1]−
δ
c
}
.
Proceeding by backward induction, we now consider the private sector that sets its ex-
pectations rationally at step 2; this is done according to (33).
I Fiscal Commitment
Substituting (34) and (32) into (49), we obtain
m(zt) =
1
1 + θMb2
[
πM − θM b(y˜t − bβ π
e
t+1 − yM + ag(zt)
]
− (cg(zt) + ωt + γβπ
e
t+1). (I.28)
Output and inflation, as of step 1 and taking into account the choice of the monetary
authority at step 4 (a), are
y(zt) =
1
1 + θMb2
[
y˜t + b(πM − βπ
e
t+1) + a g(zt) + yMθMb
2
]
(I.29)
and
π(zt) =
1
1 + θMb2
[
πM − θM b(y˜t − yM − bβπ
e
t+1 + a g(zt))
]
(I.30)
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The private sector sets its expectations rationally at step 3 by taking the expected value of
(I.30). Using (60), (49) and (62), we can solve for output and the price level as a function
of the parameters of the model
y(zt) =
1
θF + θ2M b
2
[
θF yF + θ
2
M b
2 yM + θM b(πM +
∫
δb/a)− δ(1 + θM b
2)/a
]
(I.31)
and
π(zt) =
1
θF + θ
2
M b
2
[
θFπM + θM b θF (yM − yF )− θ
2
M b
2
∫
δb/a+ δ θM b(1 + θM b
2)/a
]
.
(I.32)
Assuming the monetary authority is appropriately conservative, as defined in Section 6, one
obtains that ∫
zt
yt =
∫
zt
yF −
δ
θF a
,
∫
zt
πt = 0.
If the central bank is appropriately conservative, fiscal commitment delivers on average the
second-best allocation.
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